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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
-oooOooo-
STATE OF UTAH, RICH COUNTY, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
LARRY H. BREITWEISER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 970596-CA 
Priority No. 2 
GROUNDS 
Pursuant to Rule 35(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Mr. 
Breitweiser petitions for a rehearing because this Court has overlooked or 
misapprehended points of law and facts related to this case. These points of law deal 
with voluntariness of consent, attenuation between illegal arrest and subsequent 
consent, and physician-patient privilege.1 
RESTATEMENT OF ISSUES 
(1) Whether there was sufficient attenuation between the illegal arrest of 
Mr. Breitweiser and the blood draw? 
(2) Whether the consent to the blood draw was voluntary and without 
duress or coercion? 
(3) Whether the trial court properly denied Mr. Breitweiser's Motion to 
Arrest Judgment! 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
(1) - (2) The trial court erred by denying Mr. Breitweiser's Motion to 
Suppress Evidence. The State failed to show reasonable attenuation between the illegal 
arrest and the blood draw, and the blood draw by the EMT were privileged. 
"The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion 
to suppress evidence are reviewed under a clearly-erroneous standard, and the 
legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion given 
to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts. 
State v. O'Brien, 959 P.2d 647 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citations omitted). 
(3) The trial court erred by denying Mr. Breitweiser's Motion to Arrest 
Judgment. The State failed to show reasonable suspicion, probable cause, and exigent 
1
 All these points of law are argued below with exception of the physician-patient 
privilege due to the Rule 35 15-page limitation. However, this issue had been argued in 
detail in the previous Brief of Appellant and the Court is invited to re-visit that argue from 
the prior briefing. 
2 
circumstances in this case. The elements of the offense presented at trial are not 
consistent with the law that reasonable minds could conclude that Mr. Breitweiser 
should be found Guilty oi Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol Further, Utah Law 
requires that all the elements of the crime to proven beyond reasonable doubt in order 
to rebut the presumption of innocence. 
Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a trial court may 
arrest judgment "if the facts proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense." 
The standard for determining whether an order arresting judgment is erroneous is 
the same as that applied by an appellate court in determining whether a jury 
verdict should be set aside for insufficient evidence. Under that standard, a trial 
court may arrest a jury verdict when the evidence, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to an 
element of the crime that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt as to that element. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983); State v. 
McCardelL 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982); State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219 
(Utah 1976). 
State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L Course of the Proceedings: 
On October 25, 1996, an Information was filed and Mr. Breitweiser was 
arraigned in open court wherein he pled Not Guilty. (R. at 7). On March 7, 1996, D. 
Bruce Oliver entered his appearance and placed Mr. Breitweiser's jury demand 
20). On April 14, 1997, the court set trial to convene on Monday, July 7, 1997 at 
10:00 a.m. (R. at 42). On June 30, 1997, the defense filed Mr. Breitweiser's Motion 
to Suppress Evidena ? (I ! , it 44 61) On July 7, 1997, the trial court held both the 
3 
suppression hearing, followed by the jury trial. 
During the suppression hearing, the trial court found that the officer 
lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. Breitweiser. However, the trial court also 
determined that Mr. Breitweiser consented to the blood draw. 
//. Disposition in Trial Court: 
The trial court denied Mr. Breitweiser's Motion to Suppress Evidence and 
then the jury convicted him of DUI. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied 
Mr. Breitweiser's Motion to Arrest Judgment. Said motion was filed on the basis that 
the Information filed and the instructions to the jury establishing the elements of the 
crime were not consistent with one another. Moreover, the Information is not 
consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1953, as amended). The court denied the 
motion claiming Mr. Breitweiser was being very narrow in his focus and denied same 
because there was a lot of evidence that was introduced. (R. at 133(329}). 
///. Statement of Facts: 
(A) From the report: 
This matter involves an accident and simply the odor of alcohol and 
whether these facts constitute probable cause for an arrest. Deputy Dale Stacey's 
report reads: 
I came across the vehicle on regular patrol. It was off the road and appeared to 
have been rolled. Mr. Breitweiser was trapped under the vehicle. I immediately 
called for an ambulance and extrication equipment. We were able to get him 
out. I could smell alcohol on him. I asked if he had been drinking. He stated 
that he had a couple of beers. I placed him under arrest for DUI and requested a 
blood test. He agreed to it and Kerry Stacey drew a sample of blood. 
(R. at 8). 
Subsequently, the report reads: Mr. Breitweiser, do you understand that yoi 
under arrest ? . . . for Driving Under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs. 
(R. At 35). Additionally, the report states: 
Facts establishing the subject's actual physical control of the motor vehicle are: 
The vehicle was wrecked. He said he was the only person in the vehicle. 
(R. at 35). Finally, on the last page, the report states that when asked if he had been 
drinking, Mr. Breitweiser's response was: 
Yes, I've had a couple of beers. 
:;i : at 35). 
(B) From testimony,2 
Deputy Dale Stacey was proceeding west on State Road 39, and it runs 
approximately 20-22 miles between Woodruff and Monte Cristo, when he happened up 
to an accident. (R. ; ~ Before nrrk-ino ;u thr scene, the deputy passed three i 
four other vehicles who were traveling eastbound while he was traveling westbound. 
He concluded that the accident had just occurred as none of these other vehicles had 
stopped to assist prior to his arrn ;ral rhe location of the accident was approximately 
The record does not comport with Rule 11, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
as the trial transcript does not have a sequential number on each of the pages. Therefore 
in this section, the appellant uses the original transcript page in referring to a cite to the 
record. 
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six or seven miles from Woodruff. (R. at 109). The terrain for this area is mostly 
fields and summer range grounds for livestock. Also, the road at the scene has a small 
bend with a small incline then it straightens out. (R. at 109). 
Mr. Breitweiser's vehicle was observed to be in the field to the south side 
of the road right side up. The officer initially believed that a rancher must have driven 
it to that position but then felt that it was too close to the fence so he stopped to 
investigate. (R. at 110, 130). As he approached the vehicle he noted some damage to 
the vehicle,3 the vehicle was right side up, situated on its wheels. He also, observed 
some stuff scattered along the shoulder off to the side of the roadway. Also, some skid 
marks were noted on the road surface leading to the vehicle. (R. at 110). But the 
officer could not see any apparent cause for the accident. (E.g., like a dead animal in 
the roadway or on the shoulder. (R. at 117)). 
The officer walked down the small embankment and climbed a fence 
where the officer soon believed that the vehicle appeared to have gone through, because 
it was on the other side of the fence. As he climbed the fence a dog approached him 
and started growling, so the officer began talking to the dog, when he heard someone 
faindy say, "Hello." The officer asked the voice where he was at, the voice 
responded, "I don't know." The officer could not see the man, there was tall grass and 
3
 Admittedly though, the deputy could not tell whether the damage was fresh or old, only 
extensive. (R. at 132). The officer didn't attempt to determine whether the damage was free. (R. 
at 133). 
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two ditches in the vicinity. He then started looking for the person while continuing to 
I 
talk with the man. The deputy finally located the man by crawling through the tall 
grass. 1 he man, Mr. Breitweiser, was located pinned under the 
vehicle, while the truck's front wheels were in the first ditcl 1 and tl le i ear v* Fheels * ei e 
in the second ditch. (R. at 112-13, 129). Mr. Breitweiser was also located in the 
second ditch under the tire. 
When the officer located Mr Breitweiser, only <i limited conversation 
ensued as he complained of some chest pains so the officer indicated that he was going 
back to his squad car to call for an ambulance. While at his vehicle, he also requested 
for extrication equipment. (R. at 113-14). The officer then returned to Mr. 
Breitweiser »• *md asked him medical related questions (e,g, whether he was 
hurting, had back pain, etc.). Mr. Breitweiser responded that he was pinned, he had 
chest pains, and he couldn't move his arms. The one rear tire was slightly resting on 
Mr. Bi eitweiser's forehead, but the front tire in the ditch kept the vehicle from rolling 
back onto his head more. (R. at 115). Because, the depi ity didn't know if he suffered 
from a spinal injury that he wasn't going to move him until the ambulance, extrication 
equipment, and back immobilization equipment arrived at the scene. (R. at 116). 
Approximately 10-15 minutes later, Officer Jim Gregory, offish and 
game, arrived at the scene to assist, (r. at 117), and they walked around the scene. The 
ambulance did not arrive for approximately 25 minutes after Deputy Stacey's arrival. 
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Mr. Breitweiser was removed from under the vehicle, by the men, EMT Kerry Stacey4 
crawled underneath and steadied Mr. Breitweiser's head while the others pulled him 
from underneath the truck onto a backboard. (R. at 119). Then they carried him to the 
ambulance. During this time, Deputy Stacey smelled what he believed to be the odor 
of alcohol. (R. at 120). While in the ambulance, he got closer to Mr. Breitweiser to 
see if he could smell the odor again, and he did so he asked him if he had been 
drinking. Mr. Breitweiser stated that he had a couple of beers. (R. at 120). Based 
exclusively thereupon, the deputy placed Mr. Breitweiser under arrest and asked him if 
he would submit to a chemical test. (R. at 120). Mr. Breitweiser responded in the 
affirmative, stating, "Yes." The deputy was not the one who drew the blood, rather it 
was his brother, Kerry Stacey who drew the blood. (R. at 121). 
In trial, the deputy was asked what he thought had caused the accident and 
the response was that it just appeared to the officer that Mr. Breitweiser had driven to 
the left, over corrected and veered back to the right, (r. at 121), but he agreed that it 
was possible that Mr. Breitweiser could have simply driven through the turn because he 
was distracted, changing the radio station or getting a soda. (R. at 141). Deputy Stacey 
also conceded that it could have been possible that an animal, such as a deer, may have 
been in the road, (r. at 142-43), or even that Mr. Breitweiser could have been dozing 
off. (R. at 156). Moreover, the deputy failed to check for mechanical failure. (R. at 
4
 Deputy Stacey's brother. 
8 
156). Meanwhile, while still pinned under the truck tire, Deputy Stacey asked f\Jr. 
Breitweiser what had happened but he reported that he didn't know. (R. at 121). 
The blood draw was taken approximately, 8:40 to 8:45 p.m.5 and just 
after he had placed Mr Rreiweiser under aiiest \U :\t I4*M This was approximately 
an hour after Deputy Stacey arrived at the scene. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The blood test in which Mi Breitweiser submitted to was not voluntary. 
The State failed to overcome the argument of reasonable attenuation after the i in 1 a:\vfi il 
arrest. Hence failing to overcome the high presumption against the waiver of 
fundamental constitutional right by clear and convincing evidence that such rights were 
waived as required by State v. Harmon. .„^, jiaic v. Arroyo ( ' Fherefore, the ti ial coin t 
erroneously denied Mr. Breitweiser's Motion to Suppress Evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COUR1 "FAILED 1V CONSIDER THREE KEY POINTS OF LAW RAISED 
BY THE DEFENDANT IN BRIEFING: (I) ATTENUATION, (2) THE STATES 
HIGH BURDEN TO SHOW VOLUNTARY CONSENT, AND (3) THE BLOOD 
DRAW BEING PROTECTED UNDER THE DOCTOR-PATIENT PRIVILEGE.7 
5
 Approximately 20 minutes after arriving at the scene. (R. at 124). 
« State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) and State v. Arroyo, 796 
P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). 
7
 Mr. Breitweiser sufficiently argued all of these points in his initial Brief of 
Appellant and for the sake of this Court does include them in this petition for a second 
A. Attenuation and the High Burden of the State to Show Consent After Prior 
Police Illegality, 
This Court overlooked Mr. Breitweiser's attentuation question. In 
briefing, Mr. Breitweiser argued the consent test provided in State v. Harmon, 854 
P.2d 1037 (Utah App. 1993). In Harmon, this Court addressed the issue of consent 
and articulated the test to use in determining: 
Harmon also alleges the trial court incorrectly concluded that her consent 
to search her home was voluntary because the consent was not freely 
given but instead was a product of coercion and duress. Consent to search 
is valid under the Fourth Amendment if (1) the consent was voluntarily 
given, and (2) the consent was not obtained by police exploitation of 
the prior illegality. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 
1993); Sepulveda, 842 P.2d at 918. We apply a correction of error 
standard when a defendant challenges the "legal content" of the trial 
court's ultimate conclusion that a consent was voluntary or involuntary. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271. The trial court's factual findings will not be 
set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. IcL; Barnhart, 210 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 35. 
Whether consent to search was voluntarily given is determined from the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding the consent, including the 
characteristics of the accused and the details of the police conduct. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263; State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah 
App. 1990). In order for consent to be voluntary, (1) there must be clear 
and positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal, specific, and 
freely and intelligently given; (2) the government must prove consent 
was given without duress or coercion, express or implied; and (3) the 
time. In stead to avoid unnecessary duplicity, incorporates said arguments by reference 
only. It just appears by reading this Court's Memorandum Decision that the Court 
accidentally overlooked these arguments. Based thereon, the defendant shall cite to 
particular cases that are supplemental to the main points initial raised in the initial briefing. 
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courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of 
fundamental constitutional rights and there must be convincing evidence 
that such rights were waived. State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 
1990), affd. 1993 WL 176211 (1993). 
Id. (Emphasis added). In the case at hand, the State did not prove that the consent to 
the blood draw was voluntarily given consistent with Harmon. Under the existing 
circumstances, the consent surely was given under duress and unintelligently. The 
Utah Supreme Court in State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, (Utah 1980) provided the 
test to determine duress. The Court stated: 
Factors which may show a lack of duress or coercion include: 1) the absence of 
a claim of authority to search by the officers; 2) the absence of an exhibition of 
force by the officers; 3) a mere request to search; 4) cooperation by the owner of 
the vehicle; and 5) the absence of deception or trick on the part of the officer. 
Id. The State has not clearly shown that the consent was not under duress. 
Nonetheless, this analysis goes far beyond the duress question. As explained in State v. 
Ham, 910 P.2d 433 (Utah Ct. App. 1996): 
Even if a consent to search is deemed voluntary, it may still be invalid because it 
was "obtained by police exploitation of [a] prior illegality." Harmon, 854 P.2d 
at 1040; accord Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688; State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699, 704 
(Utah App. 1992). "When the prosecution attempts to prove voluntary consent 
after an illegal police action . . . , the prosecution 'has a much heavier burden to 
satisfy than when proving consent to search' which does not follow police 
misconduct." Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687-88 (quoting United States v. 
Melendez-Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 414 (5th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted)); 
accord Robinson, 797 P.2d at 437 n.7. This is because in addition to proving a 
valid and voluntary consent to search, the State must also establish the existence 
of intervening factors which prove that the consent was sufficiently attenuated 
from the police misconduct. Melendrez-Gonzalez, 727 F.2d at 414. 
It is well settled that evidence is not subject to exclusion if "'the connection 
i i 
between the illegal police conduct and the discovery and seizure of the evidence 
is "so attenuated as to dissipate the taint."'" Castner, 825 P.2d at 704 (citations 
omitted). 
Id. The Ham Court reiterated the analytical framework stating: 
This court has established an analytical framework for determining whether the 
State has met its burden of proving that a consent was voluntarily given: 
"(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was 
'unequivocal and specific' and 'freely and intelligently given'; (2) the 
government must prove consent was given without duress or coercion, express 
or implied; and (3) [when evaluating these first two standards, we] indulge every 
reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights 
and there must be convincing evidence that such rights were waived." 
Carter, 812 P.2d at 467 (quoting State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887-88 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990) (quoting United States v. 
Abbott, 546 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1977))); see also United States v. Medlin, 
842 F.2d 1194, 1197 (10th Cir. 1988). 
Id. In this case, the consent resulted from the officer's exploitation of the 
circumstances. Mr. Breitweiser was illegally placed under arrest after being placed 
under the physician care of the officer's brother, who was the treating EMT. This 
arrest was determined to be without probable cause (or reasonable cause). 
Nonetheless, immediately following the illegal arrest, the officer requested a blood 
draw of Mr. Breitweiser. Mr. Breitweiser submitted, however, under the 
circumstances it could not be with consent. The State concedes that Mr. Breitweiser 
was injuried in a roll-over accident. The State concedes that Mr. Breitweiser was 
pinned in his pick-up and needed to be extricated from the vehicle. How can the State 
show that any consent was not influenced by any head injury, let alone that the consent 
12 
was not unduly influenced by the illegal arrest immediately preceding the officer's 
request. 
B. "But for" Test Resulted in Prior Certiorari and Reversal, 
In the recent past, the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 
684 (Utah 1990) issued certiorari to the Court of Appeals regarding this very issue of 
attentuation and consent. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision and 
remanded it back to the trial court to determine voluntariness of the consent, and to 
specifically determine whether the consent was an exploitation of the illegal stop, and 
the scope of the consent. 
The Arroyo Court explained that 
[w]hen the prosecution attempts to prove voluntary consent after an illegal police 
action (e.g., unlawful arrest or stop), the prosecution "has a much heavier 
burden to satisfy than when proving consent to search" which does not follow 
police misconduct. United States v. Melendez-Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 414 (5th 
Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913, 916 (5th Cir. 1978)). 
Id. The Court adopted the "but for" test from U.S. Supreme Court rulings like Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88,83 S.Ct. 407 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963). 
The Court explained: 
In cases involving the admissibility of evidence obtained as a consequence of 
police misconduct, the United States Supreme Court has eschewed a "but for" 
test. Under such a test, all evidence that would not have been discovered but for 
the initial police misconduct would be suppressed. 
Id. In this case, the State has not met it's high burden to show sufficient attentuation 
13 
between the illegal arrest and the consent. There were no intervening incidents that 
would dissipate the taint caused by the illegal arrest. Judge Judkins ruled that the 
officer lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. Breitweiser. However, as this court stated 
in it's memorandum decision "although the officer on the scene did not have sufficient 
probable cause to arrest defendant, reasonable grounds existed for the officer to believe 
defendant may have been in violation of section 41-6-44(l)(a), thereby justifying the 
officer's request that defendant's blood be drawn for purposes of administering a blood 
alcohol test." This understanding goes to support good faith of the officer. Good faith 
is not the issue before this court. Good faith was struck down in State v. Mendoza, 
748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987). However, the State is required to prove good faith rather 
they are required to prove the voluntariness of the consent and this burden is high as 
explained hereinabove. In this case, the State cannot show that the consent was 
voluntary. The State cannot show that there was any intervening circumstance to 
dissipate any prior taint. The State cannot show any clear and convincing evidence that 
Mr. Breitweiser was capable of rendering consent giving the fact that he suffered 
injuries as a result of his accident. Also, the State cannot show that the consent was a 
knowing waiver of his physician-patient privilege considering that the EMT was acting 
as medical care provider rather than the arresting officer's brother. 
In this matter, the officer told Mr. Breitweiser that he was under arrest 
for Driving Under the Influence and then immediately asked him to submit to a 
14 
chemical test. After just being pinned underneath his truck by his head, it is equally 
clear that Mr. Breitweiser may not have been in the frame of mind to reason the 
question and ponder his rights! In this matter, the officer sought to exploit the illegal 
arrest by demanding a blood draw. Under the circumstances, it is quite clear that the 
question of the defendant's state of mind or his capacity to render consent should be in 
question. With this in mind, it is clear by a review of the record, that the State has 
failed to demonstrate that consent was voluntary to the point that the State has 
overcome it's Harmon and Arroyo obligation to show that the consent was clear and 
convincing. Finally, both the trial court and this Court have failed to indulge every 
possible presumption against the waiver, including the lack of capacity to consent. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Breitweiser respectfully requests this 
Court reconsider it's October 14, 1998 decision. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of 
October, 1998. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
15 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, D. Bruce Oliver, hereby certify that on this 29th day of October, 
1998,1 served a copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING upon the 
counsel for the Appellee in this matter, by mailing it to the State of Utah by first class 
mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address: George W. Preston, Rich 
County Attorney, 31 Federal Avenue, Logan, Utah 84321. 
Dated this 29th day of October, 1998. 
16 
